Logo
Home
About Us
All Publications
Sign Up
Logo
  • Home
  • Posts
  • The Rhyme: Nvidia Reports Without Its Founder & Its 1987 Echo

The Rhyme: Nvidia Reports Without Its Founder & Its 1987 Echo

The day Toshiba's chairman resigned, nine congressmen took sledgehammers to a boom box on the Capitol lawn. Three years later, Toshiba's net income had doubled. That is not a coincidence — it is the template.

"History doesn't repeat… but it rhymes." — Mark Twain

◉ THE PRESENT

Nvidia reports third-quarter earnings after the bell today, and for the first time in the company's thirty-three-year history, Jensen Huang will not be on the call. The man who built the AI chip monopoly resigned five days ago amid an FBI investigation into his relationship with an alleged Chinese intelligence operative and allegations that the connection helped funnel $7.5 billion worth of AI chips to Chinese firms through a Singapore middleman. Wall Street expects Colette Kress, the CFO who is now also interim CEO, to deliver roughly $109 billion in revenue and earnings of $2.47 a share. The numbers should be strong. Whether anyone cares about the numbers is the question.

NVDA $159.28 (−33% from Oct ATH)  |  Market cap ~$3.9T  |  Consensus rev $109B  |  EPS est $2.47  |  10-yr yield 5.14%  |  Fed rate 3.75–4.00%

A tech titan caught selling sensitive technology to a geopolitical rival, losing its top leadership in the fallout, and trying to prove the business still works without the people who built it. That happened before. Almost four decades ago, to a Japanese electronics giant that most people have forgotten was once at the center of a national security crisis every bit as fierce as this one.

◉ THE ECHO — AUGUST 25, 1987

Nine Congressmen, One radio, and a Set of Sledgehammers

Television cameras from every network were rolling on the Capitol lawn that Wednesday morning when nine members of the United States Congress walked out carrying sledgehammers. In front of them sat a small Toshiba boom box on a wooden table. Representative Duncan Hunter of California raised his hammer first and brought it down on the plastic casing, cracking it in half. Then the others took their turns. The footage played on a loop in Tokyo for weeks. It was the most visible act of the most furious trade scandal of the Cold War, and the company it was aimed at was Japan's second-largest electronics manufacturer.

The trouble had started three months earlier, in March 1987, when the Pentagon revealed that a Toshiba subsidiary called Toshiba Machine had sold the Soviet Union four enormous computer-guided milling machines capable of carving submarine propeller blades so smooth that Soviet subs could run as quietly as American ones. The technology was controlled under COCOM, the Western alliance's export-restriction agreement. Toshiba Machine had used a small Japanese trading company called Wako Koeki to broker the deal, while falsifying the export paperwork to list the machines as ordinary two-axis equipment instead of the nine-axis models they actually were. A Norwegian firm, Kongsberg Trade, had supplied the numerical control software. The sales happened between 1982 and 1984. Nobody in the West knew until a disgruntled Wako Koeki employee walked out of the company in 1985 and told COCOM authorities what he had seen.

By spring 1987, the story had gone from classified briefings to front-page news. The Detroit News ran it on April 27th. Japanese police raided Toshiba Machine's offices three days later. On May 27th, two senior Toshiba Machine executives were arrested for violating Japan's Foreign Exchange Law. The U.S. Senate voted to ban the import of all Toshiba products for two to five years. And then, on July 1st, Toshiba Corporation's chairman Shoichi Saba and president Sugiichiro Watari resigned, saying they were stepping down because of "the threat caused to Western national security."

That same day came the sledgehammers. The day after that came the lobbying war. Toshiba ran full-page apology ads in more than fifty American newspapers, calling the resignations of its chairman and president "the highest form of apology" in Japanese business culture. Toshiba and its associates spent nine million dollars lobbying against the sanctions in Congress. The final legislation, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, split the difference: Toshiba Machine was banned from selling to the U.S. for three years, while the parent company Toshiba Corporation was only barred from government contracts. Consumer sales continued. Toshiba survived. And then it did something nobody expected.

It got stronger. Net income nearly doubled, from 61 billion yen in 1987 to 121 billion yen by 1990, even after absorbing five billion yen in direct losses from the embargo. The company leaned hard into its laptop computer division, shipping the T1000 in 1987 and launching what the industry would later call the world's first true notebook PC in 1989. By 1991, Toshiba's new chairman was named Asia's CEO of the Year. The scandal that looked like it might end the company turned out to be the event that forced it to change. That is the part of the story most people forget.

◉ THE RHYME — WHAT'S IDENTICAL

Both times, the world's most sensitive technology ended up in a rival's hands because a dominant supplier's commercial incentives outran its compliance controls — and both times, the people at the top paid with their jobs before anyone proved what they knew.

◉ THE DIVERGENCE — WHAT'S DIFFERENT THIS TIME
  1. Nvidia is American; Toshiba was Japanese. In 1987, Congress was punishing a foreign company. The fury came easy because the politics pointed outward — Japan was already the trade villain of the decade. In 2026, Washington is confronting its own national champion, the company whose chips underpin the entire American AI strategy. That makes every move harder. Sanctioning Nvidia means sanctioning Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Meta, and every hyperscaler that depends on its GPUs. Treasury Secretary Bessent can talk tough, but the people who build the weapons need the same chips as the people who build the chatbots.

  2. The CEO was personally entangled; Toshiba's leaders were not. Saba and Watari resigned on principle. They had no direct involvement in the sales — their subsidiary did the deal, their trading partner faked the documents. Jensen Huang's situation is different. The allegations connect him personally to Alice Huang, the Megaspeed executive whom U.S. officials have linked to Chinese intelligence, and that connection allegedly helped move 240,000 chips into Chinese hands. That personal dimension makes the leadership vacuum deeper and the legal exposure wider.

  3. Nvidia's product has no substitute; Toshiba's did. When Toshiba Machine was banned, other machine-tool makers stepped in. The embargo hurt Toshiba but didn't cripple the buyers. Nobody can replace Nvidia. Its CUDA software ecosystem has no peer. AMD and Intel are years behind in AI training chips. If Nvidia faces real export restrictions — or worse, operational penalties — the entire AI buildout slows down. That gives Nvidia leverage that Toshiba never had.

  4. The founder may come back. Saba and Watari were career executives. They stepped aside and stayed gone. Jensen Huang co-founded Nvidia. He is Nvidia in a way that no Toshiba chairman ever was. Bloomberg reports he is already talking to allies about a comeback. Elon Musk has signed a petition with 160,000 others calling for his return. President Trump said publicly he would not mind if Huang came back. The script that played out cleanly at Toshiba — resignation, apology, replacement — may not play out the same way here.

◉ THE RECKONING — WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

Here is what happened to Toshiba after the sledgehammers and the newspaper apologies and the Senate vote. The parent company kept selling televisions and laptops and memory chips to American consumers without interruption. Only the subsidiary that made the illegal sale got cut off, and only from government buyers. Toshiba's nine-million-dollar lobbying campaign, the most expensive in Washington at that time, made sure the final law drew a sharp line between the subsidiary's crime and the parent company's products. The lesson was simple: if the customer needs what you make badly enough, the punishment will be shaped to avoid hurting the customer.

By October 1987, three months after the resignations, the scandal had faded from the headlines. What replaced it was Black Monday — the worst single-day stock crash in history, when the Nikkei fell 14.9% and the Dow dropped 22.6%. The Toshiba affair, which had consumed Washington for months, suddenly seemed small. And Toshiba, with new leadership and a chastened compliance department, went on a run. It launched the portable computing line that would make it the world's leading laptop manufacturer by the early 1990s. Its net income nearly doubled in three years. The stock recovered. The company that Congress wanted to destroy became a bigger, more profitable version of itself.

Now apply that pattern to Nvidia. The numbers coming out at 4:20 this afternoon will almost certainly be enormous — $109 billion in quarterly revenue, up roughly 90% year over year, from a product line that every major tech company on earth is desperate to buy more of. Colette Kress has done dozens of these earnings calls as CFO. She knows the script. The question is not whether Q3 was strong. It was. The question is whether the market treats this like Toshiba in the summer of 1987 — a company too important to its customers to actually punish — or whether the spy scandal, the government pressure, and the leadership vacuum combine into something the numbers alone cannot fix.

Watch the forward guidance, not the backward-looking results. Watch whether Kress says anything about China revenue, which Nvidia excluded from its Q3 outlook entirely. Watch whether the company announces a permanent CEO search timeline. And pay attention to the gross margin number at 74% — because if that starts slipping, it means the pricing power that made Nvidia the most profitable chipmaker in history is beginning to erode, and no amount of revenue growth papers over a margin decline in a company valued at roughly twenty times earnings.

Toshiba's real lesson was not about the scandal. It was about what the scandal revealed: that a company making something irreplaceable can survive almost anything, as long as the product stays essential. Nvidia's CUDA moat is deeper than anything Toshiba ever had. The smart money in 1987 bought Toshiba after the Senate vote, not before. They waited for the fury to peak, confirmed the product still moved, and stepped in when everyone else was watching the sledgehammers.

◉ TOMORROW’S WATCH

Anthropic prices its IPO Wednesday evening at $70 to $78 a share, valuing it at up to $1.4 trillion — the largest technology debut since SpaceX in June 2026. When a sector's most-hyped private company goes public in the same week its most important public company loses its founder, the last time something that concentrated happened was Netscape's August 1995 IPO landing six months after the Barings Bank collapse.

Disclaimer: This is a paid advertisement for American PowerGen's Regulation Crowdfunding offering. Please read the offering materials and Form C at https://invest.americanpowergen.com

Reservation of a ticker symbol does not indicate that the Company's securities are currently listed or traded on Nasdaq, does not constitute approval by Nasdaq, and is not a guarantee that the Company will be listed on Nasdaq. Any future listing remains subject to Nasdaq's applicable listing standards, regulatory requirements, and approvals.

Equity crowdfunding investments in private placements, and start-up investments in particular, are speculative and involve a high degree of risk, and those investors who cannot afford to lose their entire investment should not invest in start-ups.

Shares purchased in this offering are subject to a one-year lock-up before they may be resold, subject to limited exceptions. Shares are not publicly traded. The company's stated expected exit timeline is 5-10 years, via acquisition or IPO, and no exit is guaranteed.

Early Investor Bonus shares are offered for a limited time, are cumulative, and are capped at 20%. Bonus share tiers are subject to the terms of the offering.

This communication may contain forward-looking statements relating to the company, its business plan, and its strategy. Forward-looking statements are subject to material risks and uncertainties, and actual results may differ materially.

DealMaker Securities LLC, a registered broker-dealer and member of FINRA | SIPC, located at 30 East 23rd Street, 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10010, is the Intermediary for this offering.

Recommended for you

View All Publications
caret-right

Top Story Daily

"History doesn't repeat… but it rhymes."

Mark Twain

Quick Links

Home

About Us

All Publications

Subscription

© 2026 Top Story Daily